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FINDING RELIGION FOR THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
TROY L. BOOHER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars and courts have struggled to come up with a
1
They
definition of the term "religion" for the religion clauses.

have done this because they believe that finding a definition will
help provide a uniform test for determining whether something
qualifies for protection under the Free Exercise Clause or raises
2
concerns under the Establishment Clause. In this Article, I will
explain why their aspiration is misguided: providing a single
definition of the term "religion" will not help us to apply the
religion clauses. Scholars and courts focus primarily upon whether
the religion clauses require a broad or a narrow definition of the
term "religion," whereas I will argue the focus should be upon
* Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Utah;
Attorney, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P.; Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Philosophy,
University of Utah; J.D., S.J. Quinney College of Law (Utah); B.A.
Metropolitan State College of Denver. The author would like to thank Michael
W. McConnell and Ram Neta for numerous fruitful discussions and helpful
comments. The author also would like to thank Judge Judith M. Billings,
Anneliese Booher, Wade Budge, Peter Donaldson, John Durham, Leslie P.
Francis, Aaron Holland, Erik Luna, Stacia Sidlow, and Nathan Wheatley for
helpful comments.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Anand Agneshwar, Rediscovering God in the Constitution, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 295, 295-97 (1992); Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education,
Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLy 461, 482-88 (2003); Jesse H. Choper, Defining
"Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 579-80 (1982);
James M. Donovan, God Is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the
Definition of "Religion" 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 25, 25-29 (1995); Eli A.
Echols, Note: Defining Religion for ConstitutionalPurposes:A New Approach
Based on the Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117,
120-23 (2003); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw,
72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 753-54 (1984); H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms:
Can There be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State?, 13 BYU
J. PUB. L. 203 (1999); Craig Mason, Comment, "Secular Humanism" and the
Definitionof Religion: Extending a Modified "Ultimate Concern" Test to Mozert
v. Hawkins County Public Schools and Smith v. Board of School
Commissioners, 63 WASH. L. REV. 445, 445 (1988); Eduardo Penalver, The
Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 791 (1997).
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when the religion clauses require a broad definition and when they
require a narrow definition. Finding the proper focus helps to
dissolve some long-standing problems regarding the religion
clauses-the so-called "tension between the clauses" and the lack
of a definition of the term "religion" in religion clause
jurisprudence.
As many scholars have noted, finding a single definition of the
term "religion" that works in both religion clauses is extremely
difficult. Some scholars claim that the framers used "religion" to
refer only to theistic belief systems. 3 This definition, however,
would lead to legally absurd results. For instance, Hinduism
would qualify for full protection under the Free Exercise Clause
while Buddhism, or at least Zen Buddhism, would receive none. 4
In addition, courts sometimes recognize the need to protect nontheistic belief systems such as "Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical
Culture, [and] Secular Humanism" under the Free Exercise
Clause. 5
Occasionally, courts even consider conscientious
objections to war, whether based in theistic beliefs or not, to
qualify as religious.6 A legally acceptable interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause, therefore, must include non-theistic belief
systems.
A more expansive definition of the term "religion," however,
creates problems in interpreting the Establishment Clause. For
example, if a deeply-held, but non-theistic, moral objection to war
could qualify for protection under the Free Exercise Clause, then
arguably, the moral theory that generates the objection cannot be
taught in public schools without violating the Establishment
Clause. Yet such a result is legally unacceptable.
In order to avoid this kind of result, some scholars have
proposed that the term "religion" be defined differently in each
clause. 7 This, however, is an attempt to reach the desired legal
result by ignoring the text of the Constitution. The word "religion"
only occurs once in the two clauses, which read: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
3. See George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the
Constitutional Definition of "Religion" 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1520 n.5 (1983)
(claiming that "the Founders equated religion with theism"); Penalver, supra
note 2, at 805 n.91; Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of "Religion" in the First
Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 181 (2002).
4.

CHARLES TALIAFERRO, CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 17,

22, 279-81 (1998); WILLIAM R. LAFLEUR, BUDDHISM 97 (1988).
5. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 & n.11 (1961).
6. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970)
(interpreting a federal statute that exempted religious conscientious objectors
from the draft to include those with "deeply held moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs" against war).

7. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 14-6 (1978).
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8
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Thus, it seems implausible
that the definition of the term "religion" varies between the two
clauses. 9
Nonetheless, the Free Exercise Clause seems to require a
more expansive definition than the Establishment Clause. Thus,
providing a definition of "religion" that works in both clauses is
difficult. But there is another problem: there simply is no single,
correct definition of the term "religion" as it occurs in ordinary
English. These problems have led some scholars to conclude that
the religion clauses present a unique challenge for courts. For
instance, one scholar claims that "the inability of the court to
provide an adequate definition of religion in the First Amendment
has given rise to a number of inconsistent and contradictory
decisions."10
While I agree that there have been "inconsistent and
contradictory decisions," I deny that their primary cause is the
Court's inability to provide a definition of the term "religion." To
the extent that the lack of a definition hinders consistent
interpretations of the religion clauses, it creates no greater
problem for those clauses than for others. As I will argue, such
terms as "life," "executive," and "press" present nearly identical
definitional challenges for constitutional interpretation. The lack
of a precise definition of the term "religion" in the religion clauses
presents no greater interpretative challenge than does the lack of
precise definitions for terms in other clauses. In other words,
nothing
is
there
challenges,
definitional
the
despite
"religion."
term
the
about
constitutionally special
Yet there is something quite special about religion itself. A
religion can play many roles in a person's life. A religion can be
"an institution ...an ideology or worldview.. . a set of personal
loyalties ... locus of community, akin to family ties ... an aspect
of identity," and it can provide "answers to questions of ultimate
reality, and offers a connection to the transcendent."'" These
different aspects of religions are important in different legal
contexts, or so I will argue. For instance, if courts exempt
religious conscientious objectors from military service, they treat
religion as a set of personal loyalties, an ideology, and an aspect of
identity.1 2 This explains why we are also tempted to exempt

8.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

9. That is, if indeed there are two clauses. Stephen Carter has argued
that the better approach is to recognize only one clause. See Stephen L.
Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARiZ. L. REV.
293, 298-99 (2002). Nothing herein is inconsistent with this approach.
10. House, supra note 2, at 257.
11. Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 42 (2000).
12. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); Welsh, 398 U.S.
at 339-40 (1970).
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atheistic conscientious objectors: their conscientious objections
similarly involve a set of personal loyalties, ideologies, and aspects
of identity. In contrast, if courts exempt religions from antidiscrimination laws, they treat religion as a private institution
formed to exhibit and embody a worldview. The autonomy of the
religion itself would be violated if, e.g., the Catholic Church were
required to ordain and "hire" female priests.
Because different aspects of religions are relevant in different
legal contexts, what qualifies for protection under the Free
Exercise Clause or raises concerns under the Establishment
Clause depends upon the legal context. In other words, even if
there were a uniquely correct definition of the term "religion" as it
occurs in ordinary English, it should not fix the definition in the
religion clauses because what qualifies as a religion should differ
across differing legal contexts. Thus, not only should we not
expect a single definition of "religion" but, for legal purposes, we
also should not desire one.
In fact, as I will argue, providing a single definition for the
religion clauses would create more problems than it would solve.
This is not to suggest that two definitions, one for each clause,
would resolve the problems. The single occurrence of the term
"religion" in the religion clauses makes such an
interpretation
implausible. More importantly, however, a single definition for
each clause still ignores the relationship between the legal context
and what qualifies as a religion in that context.
Properly
understanding this relationship has at least two benefits: (1) we
will cease the futile search for a single definition of the term
"religion" for the religion clauses; and (2) we will obtain
a greater
understanding of what is required to reduce whatever tension
exists between the two clauses.
Perhaps more importantly,
however, we will be in a better position to diagnose the
"inconsistent and contradictory decisions."
My argument will advance in three stages. First, I will
outline the different approaches scholars and courts have used to
provide a definition of the term "religion" in the religion clauses
and then expose the problems with each approach. Second, I will
show that even if we could produce an acceptable, single definition
of the term "religion," it would not help us interpret and apply the
religion clauses because what qualifies as religion differs across
differing legal contexts. Third, I will illustrate how recognizing
the contextual nature of what qualifies as a religion places us in a
better position to diagnose and reduce whatever tension exists
between the clauses. In the end, the interpretation of the religion
clauses that emerges from this recognition is that the religion
clauses are best understood as extensions of other clauses--Free
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13
Speech, Equal Protection, etc.-into the religious context.

II.

THE FUTILE SEARCH FOR A SINGLE DEFINITION OF THE TERM
"RELIGION"

Before examining different proposed definitions of the term
"religion," we must first become clear about what it is that we
want from an adequate definition for the religion clauses. The
motivation of those attempting to provide a definition of "religion"
14
is to help courts avoid "inconsistent and contradictory decisions."'
To do so, a definition must satisfy at least two minimal criteria.
First, it must assist courts in deciding difficult cases. Otherwise,
it cannot help to eliminate the problems supposedly created by
lack of an adequate definition. Second, a definition cannot produce
clearly counterintuitive legal results: it must be neither too broad
nor too narrow. Some deviation from our basic intuitions about
what the religion clauses protect or forbid is tolerable (and
perhaps expected), but gross deviations are a sign that the
definition simply trades inconsistency for counterintuitive results.
In general, there are three approaches used by scholars and
courts to provide a definition of the term "religion" in the religion
clauses. First, some scholars provide definitions by trying to
discern how the framers used the term "religion." I will call this
the "originalist approach." Second, some scholars attempt to
identify something unique to religions and appeal to that unique
I will call this the "uniqueness
trait to define "religion."
Third, some scholars, and many courts, identify
approach."
religions by asking whether something is sufficiently similar to
examples of religions. I
things that are widely accepted as clear
5
will call this the "analogical approach."'
A. The OriginalistApproach
Originalists look to how the framers used the language in the
Constitution as a method of discerning its meaning. Specifically,
they look to how the framers used the term "religion" in order to
identify its meaning in the religion clauses. There seems to be
general agreement about what the framers meant when they used

13. This is not to say, however, that the religion clauses are superfluous.
But see, Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOy. U. CHI.
L.J. 71 (2001) (arguing that any protection afforded to religious expression
under the Free Exercise Clause already is aff.'rded under the Free Speech
Clause).
14. House, supra note 2, at 257; Donovan, supra note 2, at 25-26; Christine
L. Niles, Epistemological Nonsense? The Secular/Religious Distinction, 17
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 561 (2003).
15. The futility of some of these approaches may seem obvious. I discuss
them because, as noted throughout, scholars and courts continue to employ
them.
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the term "religion" in the First Amendment. 16 As George Freeman
argues, the framers referred to a Creator, Deity, or Maker
whenever they used the term "religion." 17 From this, Freeman
concludes that the framers "equated religion with theism."18 Many
scholars are persuaded that for an originalist, theism is "a
constitutionally necessary ingredient to qualify a belief system as
religion." 19
If this originalist definition is correct, then it is unacceptably
narrow and thereby fails to satisfy the second criterion of
adequacy for a definition.
For instance, Zen Buddhism and
Taoism would not be religions under such a definition. 20 When we
insert the definition into the religion clauses, the results are
legally unacceptable.
For example, the Free Exercise Clause
would not protect Zen Buddhism and Taoism; nor would the
Establishment Clause prohibit governments from requiring
citizens to practice them. 21 Even if a purely theistic definition may
have been legally adequate in 1791, it is no longer legally
adequate. Consequently, this definition fails to satisfy the second
22
criterion of adequacy for a definition.
B. The UniquenessApproach
The apparent failure of originalism drives many scholars to
define the term "religion" by attempting to identify traits that all
religions share and that only religions possess. If such traits exist,
then perhaps they can be used to define the term "religion" for the
16. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J.,
concurring); Freeman, supra note 3 at 1520-23; Penalver, supra note 2, at 804
n.91; Strang, supra note 3, at 181-83.
17. Freeman, supra note 3, at 1520-23.
18. Id. at 1520.
19. Donovan, supra note 2, at 36.
20. LAFLEUR, supra note 4, at 96; TALIAFERRO, supra note 4, at 279-81.
21. Even if there are other constitutional reasons why government could
not require such conduct, it nonetheless would be legally absurd if violation of
the Establishment Clause were not among them.
22. It is worth noting that originalism is not necessarily committed to the
theistic definition traditionally attributed to it. The recent shift in focus for
many originalists from the intent of the framers to the original understanding
of the constitutional text makes the fact that the framers only had theistic
religions in mind less than decisive when interpreting the scope of the religion
clauses. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalismfor Nonoriginalists,45 LOY. L.
REV. 611, 611 (1999); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity:
Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1256 (1997);
Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's 'Moral Reading' of the Constitution, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1269 (1997); Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural
Law Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2093
(2001); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 37-41 (1997). Nothing in this Article is inconsistent with the
alternative interpretations available to such an approach.
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religion clauses. We can divide attempts to identify something
unique to religion by the type of unique trait sought: (1) a unique
set of concepts that compose the content of the term "religion"; (2)
a unique kind of input that produces religious beliefs; and (3) a
unique kind of output that religious beliefs produce. I will call
these three different methods the "content-based method," the
"epistemological
method,"
and
the "functional
method,"
respectively.
1.

The Content-Based Method

Those employing the content-based method attempt to specify
the simple concepts that compose the complex content of the word
"religion." This is a familiar way in which we try to define terms.
For instance, we define the term "%achelor" by decomposing it into
the simple concepts that compose its content, namely "male,"
"unmarried," and "adult." With the simple concepts identified, we
can determine which things are bachelors; in this case, the
unmarried male adults. If we identify the simple concepts that
compose the content of the term "religion," then we similarly may
be able to determine which things are religions.
Using the content-based method, Anand Agneshwar defines
religion as "a system of beliefs, based on supernatural
assumptions, that posits the existence of apparent evil, suffering,
or ignorance in the world and announces a means of salvation or
redemption from those conditions." 23 For Agneshwar, there must
be supernatural content, among other things, for any purported
religion to satisfy his definition.
Agneshwar's definition fails, however, because not all
religions employ the supernatural. For example, pantheists, some
Unitarians, and Taoists do not.24 Yet they all should qualify for
protection under the Free Exercise Clause and raise concerns
under the Establishment Clause. If a set of concepts does not
apply to some religions, then that set cannot comprise the simple
concepts out of which the content of the term "religion" is
composed. Because some religions fail to employ the supernatural,
Agneshwar's definition fails.
Ludwig Wittgenstein's often-cited discussion of the term
"game" illustrates the general problem with the content-based
method. 25 Wittgenstein points out that there is no single way to
decompose the content of the term "game" into simple
constituents. Hockey, backgammon, throwing a ball against a
wall, and solitaire are all games. But what do they have in

23. Agneshwar, supra note 2, at 296.
24. MICHAEL PETERSON ET AL., REASON AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF 4 (1991).
25. LUDWIG WITTTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 66 (G.E.M.
trans., 3d ed. 1958).
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common? There is no set of simple concepts that applies to all
games, such as "board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympicgames," etc. 26 Because the things that qualify as games are so
diverse, there simply is no single decomposition of the term "game"
into simple constituents.
The same is true for the term "religion." Zen Buddhists do
not believe in a Deity, some early religions lack awe and
reverence, and Mormons do not believe in the transcendent.27
Also, while something as broad as a concern for ultimate reality
may capture all religions, it also likely captures much of
mainstream science and philosophy. Any set of simple concepts
that applies to some religions will fail to apply to all religions or
will apply to non-religions. Thus, the content-based method fails
to satisfy the second criterion of adequacy for a definition because
ultimately it produces definitions that are too narrow, too broad,
or both.28
2. The EpistemologicalMethod
Those employing the epistemological method attempt to
identify unique inputs for religious beliefs. According to the
epistemological method, religious beliefs are arrived at in a unique
way. If we can identify a distinctive epistemology of religious
beliefs, then perhaps we can use it to define the term "religion" for
the religion clauses.
Craig Mason uses the epistemological method to identify
religions as belief systems involving ultimate concerns where
"ultimate" means something like "all values and 'knowledge'
which
cannot be proven true, or even tested, by empirical evidence [but
rather] rest upon some type of non-rational 'faith."' 29 Robert Audi
relies upon an epistemological distinction to argue that religious
arguments should not shape public policy. 30 Audi distinguishes
religious arguments by claiming that they do not provide

26. Id.
27. TALIAFERRO, supra note 4, at 22-23.

28. The following definition provided by Emanuel Swedenborg incurs

similar problems: Religion is a life system that "recognizes what is divine;...
includes rules governing behavior, traceable to what is divine, that do not
contradict the 'golden rule;' and. . . calls on its participants to conform to the
rules of the divine." Echols, supra note 2, at 121. It is unclear why a religion
could not reject the divine or the "golden rule" and yet remain a religion.
Perhaps recognizing this, Echols later states that "a life system's rules proceed
from the divine in some way that is analogous to those of the major religions,"
which seems closer to the analogical approach. Id. at 133-34. Because the
analogical approach also fails, see infra Part II.C., it does not matter which

approach Echols would choose.
29. Mason, supra note 2, at 456.
30. Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic
Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 678 (1993).
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motivation for a "rational and informed person."31 Audi then uses
this epistemological distinction to conclude that we must "separate
32
religion from law and public policy."
Such epistemological distinctions are widely accepted. For
instance, agnostics think that belief in a Deity is epistemologically
different from ordinary beliefs. Atheists also think that there is
something epistemologically unique (and suspect) about belief in a
Deity.
Most theists accept that belief in a Deity is
epistemologically unique as well. Wittgenstein is credited with
pointing out that if you tell me that God is in the next room, and I
look in the room and report that God is not there, I have not
disproved your claim, but rather have shown that I do not
understandyour claim.
Even if this is the case, however, there is still a problem with
defining the term "religion" using an epistemological distinction.
Different religions have different conceptions of what justifies
their beliefs. For instance, what, if anything, justifies the beliefs
of Buddhists differs from what, if anything, justifies the beliefs of
Calvinists. 33 No single epistemological category captures all types
of religious beliefs. Some religions do not incorporate a Deity and,
more to the point, some religions do not advocate accepting their
doctrines on faith. 34 Thus, even if one can distinguish some
religious beliefs epistemologically, one cannot similarly distinguish
all religious beliefs because religious beliefs are too diverse in their
epistemology.
Even if we ignore some of the diversity of religious beliefs and
consider only belief in a Deity, the epistemological method still
fails. The theological and philosophical questions that one must
answer to establish that belief in a Deity has a distinctive
epistemology are too contentious for this method to produce an
adequate definition. In other words, the question of whether belief
in a Deity has a distinctive epistemology is at least as disputed as
the original question of which belief systems are the referents of
35
the term "religion."

31. Id. at 690.
32. Id. at 691.
33. TALIAFERRO, supra note 4, at 279-81. See also PETERSON ET AL., supra
note 24, at 33.
34. TALIAFERRO, supra note 4, at 279-81.
35. For instance, while an agnostic does not know that a Deity exists, she
need not take a stand upon whether others know that a Deity exists or
whether others know that a Deity exists in the same way as she knows that
things exist generally. In other words, while an agnostic lacks evidence of a
Deity's existence, she need not take a stand upon what kind of evidence she
lacks. Also, some theists, e.g., pantheists, think that we learn about a Deity
the same way that we learn about tables, namely by empirical evidence. See
Penalver, supra note 2, at 818-21. Perhaps this only reveals that people mean
different things when they use the term "Deity," but if so, the prospects of
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For some atheists, the fact that some religious beliefs require
faith is not enough to make them epistemologically distinctive.
For instance, some atheist philosophers think that all beliefs are
justified (and perhaps true) only relative to a perspective.3 6 For
these philosophers, all beliefs-even scientific ones-ultimately
stem from an unsupportable assumption. Unlike some theists who
elevate religious beliefs to the epistemological status of scientific
beliefs, these philosophers demote scientific beliefs to the
epistemological status of unsupportable religious beliefs.
But even if we reject these philosophers' radical theses
regarding scientific beliefs, it is more difficult to reject a similar
claim regarding moral beliefs. In other words, even if scientific
beliefs are not ultimately based upon an unsupportable
assumption, it seems that non-religious moral beliefs are. As
Larry Alexander points out, neither moral beliefs nor religious
beliefs are empirically grounded in the same way as scientific
beliefs.3 7 While Alexander's claim is not universally accepted,
many philosophers believe that what provides us reason to accept
moral beliefs, e.g., moral sentiments, is not itself capable of further
support.3 8 If these philosophers are correct, then even if we can
distinguish
scientific
beliefs
from
religious
beliefs
epistemologically, we cannot similarly distinguish moral beliefs
and religious beliefs.
At the very least, these complexities reveal that
epistemologically distinguishing religious beliefs depends upon
resolving extremely controversial theological and epistemological
questions. Thus, the epistemological distinction that scholars like
Audi rely upon to conclude that we must "separate religion from
law and public policy" is itself extremely contentious. Ironically,
the theological and philosophical questions that must be resolved
to maintain such a distinction are precisely the kind of questions
that the religion clauses are designed to keep government from
resolving.
What this shows is that an epistemological distinction cannot
capture all religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are epistemologically
too diverse. For instance, faith plays virtually no role in Zen
Buddhism, but an enormous role in most Christian religions. 39
identifying an epistemological marker for all religious beliefs are even less
likely.
36. There is a vast amount of literature on this subject, but one
representative is Richard Rorty, Foucault and Epistemology, in FOUCAULT: A
CRITICAL READER 41, 44-45 (David Couzens Hay ed., 1986).
37. Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 792-94 (1993).
38. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 455-618 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed., 1978).
39. See TALIAFERRO, supra note 4, at 279-81; PETERSON ET AL., supra note
24, at 33.

FindingReligion for the FirstAmendment

2004]

One cannot identify something unique to religions by discerning
distinctive inputs of religious beliefs. Thus, the epistemological
method fails to satisfy the second criterion of adequacy for a
definition: it produces definitions that are too narrow, too broad, or
simply too contentious.
3.

The FunctionalMethod

Scholars employing the functional method attempt to identify
unique outputs of religious beliefs. According to the functional
method, religious beliefs play a unique role in the lives of
adherents. For example, James Donovan uses this method to
identify religions by whether they, roughly, respond "to the
existential concerns of the individual '40 by serving "the
psychological function of alleviating death anxiety."'
Another
scholar who employs this method is Keith Yandell:
A religion proposes a diagnosis (an account of what it takes the
basic problem facing human beings to be) and a cure (a way of
permanently and desirably solving that problem): one basic problem
shared by every human person and one fundamental solution that,
however adapted to different cultures and cases, is essentially the
42
same across the board.
Those attempting to identify a unique role played by religious
belief systems encounter problems similar to those that plague the
content-based method. Again, Wittgenstein's discussion of the
term "game" is informative. There is no single role that games
play in our lives. Even if there were, there would be non-games
that also play that role. The same is true of religions. For
instance, why is alleviating death anxiety a religious role,
whereas, presumably, alleviating stage fright is not? Religious
beliefs can play either, or neither, role. Reading Epicurus provides
a set of beliefs that alleviates death anxiety, but it is not thereby a
religion. Also, identifying "one basic problem shared by every
human person and one fundamental solution" is not unique to
religions. Freudian psychology diagnoses a basic problem facing
all humans and then proposes a cure, and yet Freudian psychology
is not a religion. There is no unique role that religions, or games,
play in our lives. The functional method fails to satisfy the second
criterion of adequacy for a definition because the definitions it
produces are either too narrow or too broad.
None of the three methods has identified a trait that all
religions share and only religions possess. There is no single
decomposition of the content of the term "religion" into simple

40. Donovan, supra note 2, at 29.
41. Id. at 95.
42.

KEITH

YANDELL,

INTRODUCTION 17 (1999).

PHILOSOPHY

OF

RELIGION:

A

CONTEMPORARY
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constituents. It is too contentious whether (and unlikely that
enough) religious beliefs are epistemologically distinctive. No
distinctive role has been identified that all and only religious belief
systems play. Thus, the uniqueness approach fails to provide an
adequate definition of the term "religion" for the religion clauses.
If we are going to define the term "religion" for the religion
clauses, we need an approach that does not rely upon the existence
of such unique traits.
C. The AnalogicalApproach
Those
employing the analogical approach, perhaps
recognizing the failure of the uniqueness approach, do not attempt
to identify traits unique to religions. Rather, they compare a belief
system with belief systems from paradigmatic traditional religions
to determine whether the belief system 'in question has more in
common with religious belief systems than with non-religious
ones.
For example, Eduardo Penalver identifies religions by
comparing belief systems with one theistic religion, one nontheistic religion, and one pantheistic religion. 43 Similarly, George
Freeman identifies something as a religion if it is more likely "to
promote a paradigmatic religious belief system than it is to
promote a paradigmatic irreligious belief system."44 Also, many
45
courts have adopted this "definition by analogy" approach.
There is an initial problem that those employing the
analogical approach must address: they must identify which
similarities are the relevant ones for comparison. This problem,
however, does not seem difficult to overcome. After all, native
English speakers seem to have no trouble identifying new religions
as such. For instance, native speakers have come to identify
Mormonism as a religion even though Joseph Smith founded it
after the term "religion" already had a meaning. They likely
identified Mormonism as a religion because it resembles belief
systems accepted as religions in certain ways: it has a "belief in
God; a comprehensive view of the world ... belief in some form of
afterlife; communication with God ... the use of sacred texts,"
etc. 46 Even though, as we have seen, none of these traits are
possessed by all and only religions, they are relevant to identifying
religions; otherwise they never would have been plausible
candidates.
Thus, it seems that we already make accurate
assumptions about which similarities are relevant when we
compare a belief system with paradigm examples of religions and
non-religions.
43. Penalver, supra note 2, at 817.
44. Freeman, supra note 3, at 1563.
45. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1981)
(listing other courts adopting this approach).
46. Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 767.
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Even after we determine the relevant similarities, however,
the analogical approach cannot help us when the subject matter
requires precision. To illustrate, consider the following example,
again involving the term "game." Suppose that schoolchildren
race to get their math problems done first whenever they receive
an assignment. They do not agree to do this, nor do they receive
an explicit reward for finishing first. Is this a game? Perhaps we
would call it a game, and perhaps we would (likely unconsciously)
analogize with paradigm examples of games to make our decision,
just as the analogical approach suggests. Someone might even
refer to it as "the schoolchildren's little game." But what follows
from this?
Assume that the school would receive a $100,000 grant if the
schoolchildren's attempts to finish first really constitute a game.
Ordinarily it would not matter whether it really is a game. It is
enough that it is not wrong to call it a game. But the fact that it is
not wrong to call it a game does not entail that it is wrong not to
call it a game. In other words, even though someone does not
abuse the language by calling it a "game," someone who refuses to
call it a "game" also does not abuse the language. There simply is
no clear answer in such circumstances. The fact that it is not
incorrect to call it "the schoolchildren's little game" decides
nothing about the funding.
When we analogize with paradigm examples of games, the
most we can conclude is that this is a borderline case: the
schoolchildren's attempts to finish first share relevant similarities
with some games, but not others.
Thus, contrary to Kent
Greenwalt's hope, the analogical approach itself cannot "help us
resolve borderline questions and work toward clarification of the
conditions required for the application of the concept." 47 When the
situation requires extraordinary precision, the analogical approach
provides no guidance in resolving borderline cases, even if we
could identify all of the similarities relevant for comparison.
It requires precision for us to determine whether something
satisfies the definition of the term "religion" when interpreting the
religion clauses.
After all, native English speakers do not
seriously disagree about whether Catholicism is a religion.
Rather, people disagree about whether borderline cases, e.g.,
Shintoism, are religions. 48
As we ordinarily use the term
"religion," it is not wrong either to call Shintoism a religion or to
refuse to call it a religion in certain contexts. The analogical
approach does not help to determine whether borderline cases
such as Shintoism really are religions. The analogical approach

47. Id. at 766.
48. DAVID S. NOSS, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 322 (10th ed.
1999);

LAN

S. MARKHAM, A WORLD RELIGIONS READER 187-215 (1996).
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does not lead to counterintuitive results like the other approaches
we have considered, but it also cannot help to resolve "inconsistent
and contradictory decisions." The analogical approach fails to
satisfy the first criterion of adequacy for a definition because it
cannot assist courts in deciding hard cases.
At this point, we can conclude that the analogical approach
cannot supply the requisite precision to decide borderline cases.
However, we also can understand why. Where extraordinary
precision is needed, the intuitions of native speakers about which
things particular terms refer to (semantic intuitions) are not
helpful. After all, it is differences in our semantic intuitions that
make borderline cases borderline in the first place. For example,
native speakers' semantic intuitions are not uniform regarding
whether the term "religion" properly refers to Shintoism. This
same lack of uniformity makes borderline cases difficult for courts.
Our semantic intuitions cannot help to resolve difficult cases;
rather, they are what make the cases difficult in the first place.
Thus, a semantic theory that merely describes or explains our
semantic intuitions cannot help to resolve difficult religion clause
cases. 49 The confidence that courts and scholars have that the
analogical approach can identify religions for interpretation of the
religion clauses is simply misplaced.
None of the three approaches that we have examined provides
an adequate definition of the term "religion" for the religion
clauses. Thus, the Court's inability to provide a definition of the
term "religion" in the First Amendment is understandable. But
without such a definition, how can we avoid the "inconsistent and
49. It is worth noting that this criticism of the analogical approach does not
depend upon adopting a traditional theory of meaning and reference whereby
terms refer via descriptions native speakers associate with them.
An
alternative theory of reference, developed by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam,
whereby terms refer not via descriptions native speakers associate with them
but because of facts external to native speakers, does not change the result.
See generally SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (9th ed., Harvard U.

Press 1996) (1972); Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of "Meaning", in MIND,
LANGUAGE, AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 215-71 (1975).

While it is

plausible (but extremely controversial) that natural-kind terms such as
"water" and "gold" do not refer to objects that satisfy descriptions native
speakers associate with the terms-such as "wet" and 'liquid" or "hard" and
"yellowish"-but rather are rigid designators of facts external to native
speakers-such as atomic structure-it is not at all clear how terms like
"religion" similarly are rigid designators, despite the efforts of some scholars
to apply this theory of reference to moral and legal terms. See generally NICOS
STAVROPOULOS, OBJECTIVITY IN LAW (1996). Unlike with science (and as we

have seen), native English speakers disagree about what "facts" are relevant
to fixing the referents of the term "religion" as well as about who are the
"experts" (analogous to scientists) needed to provide the authoritative opinions
regarding the proper referents of the term "religion." Thus, this alternative
theory of reference cannot save either the analogical approach or the
uniqueness approach.
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contradictory" religion clause decisions that many scholars
attribute to the lack of such a definition? In other words, while I
may have explained why the Court has not provided a definition of
the term "religion," I also seem to have explained why religion
clause jurisprudence will continue to produce "inconsistent and
contradictory decisions." As I will argue next, however, the lack of
a single, correct definition of the term "religion" does not doom
religion clause jurisprudence.
III. THE RELIGION CLAUSES DO NOT REQUIRE A UNIQUE DEFINITION
OF RELIGION

The primary cause of "inconsistent and contradictory" religion
clause decisions is not the lack of a uniquely correct definition of
the term "religion" as it occurs in ordinary English. If it were,
then we should expect many other clauses to suffer from the same
problem. For instance, the term 'life" in the due process clauses is
just as imprecise. 50 Deciding whether a fetus or a brain-dead
patient qualifies as "living" requires one to take a stance on
contentious moral questions. Definitions of the term "life" suffer
from the same imprecision as definitions of the term "religion."
The same is true for the term "executive." 51 Whether a
particular action taken by the EPA is executive or legislative in
nature depends upon whether the action is law-making or lawenforcing. But where one draws the boundary between the two
depends upon one's political theory. Therefore, definitions of the
term "executive" also suffer from the same imprecision as
definitions of the term "religion."
Finally, consider the term "press."52 Does producing a web
page or a community newsletter qualify as a press? The Court has
refrained from defining the term "press," likely because such a
definition would create more difficult cases than it would resolve.
Whatever definition the Court provides, people would manipulate
their activities to qualify under the definition; it seems much wiser
to focus upon, e.g., content and viewpoint. It would be just as
counterproductive for the Court to attempt to provide a single
definition of the term "religion" as it would to provide a single
definition of the term "press." The stakes for qualifying as a
religion simply are too high. Not only does it seem unlikely that
the Court could provide uniquely correct definitions of the terms
"religion" and "press," but it also seems imprudent for them to do
so.

The fact that the term "religion" has no uniquely correct
definition does not create a special problem for the religion

50. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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clauses. Thus, there is no reason to think that inconsistency in
religion clause decisions is primarily due to the lack of an
adequate definition of the term "religion." Yet how can courts
properly apply the religion clauses without such a definition?
Larry Alexander claims that because "any attempt to draw a line
between secular and sectarian. .. will be impossible to defend
theoretically... the First Amendment's religion clauses cannot be
applied." 53 Although any line between secular and sectarian
seems theoretically indefensible, this does not mean that the
religion clauses cannot be applied. If a single definition were
needed, then perhaps there could be no consistent religion clause
jurisprudence. But, as I will illustrate, the religion clauses do not,
and could not, require a single definition of the term "religion" in
all legal contexts.
Even if our semantic intuitions would endorse a single
definition of the term "religion," we should not employ such a
definition for the religion clauses. A single definition will not work
because what qualifies as religion for legal purposes differs across
differing legal contexts. Religion plays many roles in people's
lives.
A religion can be "an institution.., an ideology or
worldview... a set of personal loyalties.., locus of community,
akin to family ties... an aspect of identity," and it can provide
"answers to questions of ultimate reality, and offero a connection
to the transcendent." 54 These different aspects of religion are (and
should be) important in different legal contexts. As the legal
context differs, what the religion clauses refer to does not remain
constant. To illustrate, consider the following three examples.
First, in some legal contexts, the legally relevant aspects of
religion are religion as a set of personal loyalties, an ideology, and
a facet of personal identity. To illustrate, consider two cases,
United States v. Seeger 55 and Welsh v. United States,56 interpreting
the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which exempted
from military service anyone "who by reason of their religious
training and belief [is] conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form." 57 Congress explicitly excluded objections based
upon "political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
53. Alexander, supra note 37, at 792.
54. McConnell, supranote 11, at 42.
55. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
56. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
57. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164-65. Even though the Court is interpreting a
statute in Welsh and Seeger, scholars and other courts generally agree that the
Court's discussion is relevant to the constitutional definition of the term
"religion." See, e.g., Malnak, 592 F.2d at 204 (Adams, J., concurring) ("As a
matter of logic and language, if the Court is willing to read 'religious belief so
as to comprehend beliefs based upon pantheistic and ethical views, it might be
presumed to favor a similar inclusive definition of 'religion' as that term
appears in the first amendment.").
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personal moral code."58 Thus, for the Court to find that Seeger
and Welsh qualified for the exemption, it had to conclude that the
objections of Seeger and Welsh were religious.
In Welsh, the Court found that for one's beliefs to qualify as
religious, it is enough that the beliefs are held "with the strength
59
Similarly in Seeger, the
of traditional religious convictions."
Court proposed the following test to determine whether one
qualifies for the exemption: "A sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption." 60 Those who "admittedly qualify" do so by having a
religiously informed conscience, which focuses upon religion as a
set of personal loyalties, an ideology, and a facet of personal
identity.
The institutional aspect of religions is not directly relevant to
what qualifies as religion in this context. Recognizing this, the
Court exempted Welsh and Seeger even though Seeger was likely
an agnostic and Welsh's beliefs were only "religious in the ethical
61
The Court recognized
sense of the word," whatever that means.
that the objections of Welsh and Seeger similarly implicated a set
of personal loyalties, an ideology, and a facet of personal identity.
Whether or not these cases ultimately were decided correctly, we
can see the fact that one's religion is organized, a locus of
community, or practiced by large segments of the population is not
directly relevant to whether one's objection qualifies as religious in
this context.
Second, in some legal contexts, the legally relevant aspects of
religion are religion as an institution exhibiting and embodying a
To illustrate, consider a case where a
certain worldview.
government regulation threatens religious institutional autonomy,
e.g., a new law applies existing anti-discrimination laws to
religions such that the Catholic Church is required to ordain and
"hire" female priests. What aspects of religion would be relevant
when challenging such a law? If enforced, such a law would
threaten the institutional integrity of certain religions. Thus, a
religion must at least be organized to qualify for protection in this
context. Businesses owned by Seeger and Welsh, no matter how
deeply they held their views, would not be exempt from such a law
on religious grounds. Even with these first two brief examples, we
can see that what qualifies as religion differs in differing legal
contexts.
Third, in some legal contexts, the legally relevant aspects are
all of those relevant in the first two contexts. To illustrate,
58.
59.
60.
61.

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 172.
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340.
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341.
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consider the priest-penitent privilege. In 1843, a court held that
the privilege must be recognized on grounds very similar to those
relevant in the conscientious objector context: to fail to recognize
the privilege would force a priest to violate either an ecclesiastical
oath or a judicial oath. 62 The court reasoned that to avoid forcing
a priest to choose between perjury and contempt, the law must
exempt the priest from ever having to appear. 63 Religion was even
described as a deeply personal "affair between God and man." 64
Yet the court also stated that in this context it "is essential to
the free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances should be
administered - that its ceremonies as well as its essentials should
be protected."6 5 The practices of the religion as an organization,
along with the expectations of its members regarding its religious
practices, are important in this context.
The institutional
autonomy of the organization is at issue, just as it was in the
context involving exemptions from anti-discrimination laws. In
the priest-penitent context, all of the aspects of religion that were
relevant in the first two examples are relevant. Thus, because
more must be shown before an entity can qualify for protection in
the priest-penitent context, fewer entities should qualify in this
context than in either of the first two legal contexts.
However such cases should be decided, we can see that the
same definition of the term "religion" will not work in all three
legal contexts because what qualifies as religion varies as the legal
context varies. As a result, even if there were a single definition of
the term "religion" as it occurs in ordinary English, it would not
help us interpret and apply the religion clauses. Thus, it cannot
be the lack of an adequate definition of the term "religion" that
explains "inconsistent and contradictory" religion clause decisions.
One may object that I have confused two crucially different
things: (i) determining what qualifies as religion in any given legal
context; and (ii) defining the term "religion." After all, the correct
definition simply could be very broad in all contexts, and yet not
all things that are religions would qualify in all legal contexts. For
example, political speech does not cease to be speech just because
it is not protected from government censure in certain forums. If I
want to criticize the government on a public street corner, the Free
Speech Clause generally prohibits government from silencing me.
But if I want to criticize the government on a military base, the
Free Speech Clause is less likely to prohibit the government from
66
silencing me.
62. People v. Philips, (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reprinted in 1 CATH. LAW.
199 (1955).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Brown v. Palmer, 944 F.2d 732, 739 (10th Cir. 1991).
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If my speech is not protected from government censure in the
second context, it is not because my criticisms cease to be speech.
In both cases, my criticisms qualify as speech, yet what actually
qualifies for protection varies as the legal context varies. Perhaps
similarly there is a single definition of the term "religion," but
what qualifies for protection under the Free Exercise Clause or
raises concerns under the Establishment Clause is what should
vary with the legal context.
This objection makes an important point that illustrates a
dilemma for those who claim that an adequate definition of the
term "religion" will resolve "inconsistent and contradictory
decisions." Either the definition of the term "religion" must
incorporate the legal context or it cannot help us to determine
what qualifies as religion in the religion clauses because it is too
broad. Either way, a definition of the term "religion" as it occurs
in ordinary English will not help us to interpret and apply the
religion clauses. Thus, it was a mistake for so many legal scholars
to believe that providing a definition of the term "religion" could
help resolve the "inconsistent and contradictory decisions" in the
first place. The legal context matters and, as I will argue- next,
recognizing how it matters helps solve a certain interpretative
puzzle involving the religion clauses.
IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE CLAUSES

Recognizing that what qualifies as religion in the religion
clauses varies with the legal context sheds new light upon the socalled "tension between the clauses." To illustrate, consider the
puzzle that emerges when we combine the following claims:
1. The Free Exercise Clause singles out religion for
protection.
2. The Establishment Clause singles out religion as
ineligible for some government benefits.
3. Because the same term "religion" is used in both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, what
qualifies as religion is the same for both clauses.
require a broad
Exercise contexts
4. Some Free
"conscientious objector" definition.
5. If what qualifies as religion is the same in all legal
contexts, then the broad "conscientious objector"
definition applies in all Free Exercise contexts.
6. If the broad "conscientious objector" definition applies in
all Establishment Clause contexts, then too much
government conduct will be forbidden.
Scholars have attempted to solve this puzzle in different
ways. Before considering possible solutions, however, notice that
denying 2 only makes matters worse. It simply is not plausible to
interpret the Establishment Clause as forbidding the government
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from benefiting non-religious individuals or institutions. Thus, it
is not a viable solution to the puzzle to deny 2. Denying any of the
others, however, are viable options.
A. The Free Exercise Clause Singles out Religion for Protection
One way to solve the puzzle is to deny 1, or to deny that the
Free Exercise Clause singles out religion for protection.
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager provide the best
example of those scholars who deny 1. For Eisgruber and Sager,
what "properly motivates constitutional solicitude for religious
practices is their distinct vulnerability to discrimination, not their
distinct value; and what is called for, in turn, is protection against
discrimination, not privilege against legitimate governmental
concerns. '67
Eisgruber and Sager replace "the paradigm of
privilege with that of protection."68 Religion is special in two ways:
"religious activities are more important than matters
of fashion or
recreation.., and people are especially likely to undervalue, or
persecute, religious activities different from their own." 69
From this, Eisgruber and Sager advocate a principle of Equal
Regard, which "requires simply that government treat the deep,
religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with
the same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens
generally." 70 To qualify for protection, a claimant must show
(a) that a general law significantly interferes with some actions
motivated by her deep religious commitment; and (b) that had her
deep, religiously inspired concerns been treated with the same
regard as that enjoyed by the fundamental concerns of citizens
generally, she would have been exempted from the reach of the
71
general law.
Government can accommodate religion only if it similarly
accommodates, or it similarly would accommodate, non-religion.
In this way, Eisgruber and Sager deny 1, or they deny that the
Free Exercise Clause singles out religion for protection.
There are at least three problems with Eisgruber and Sager's
account. The first problem is obvious: the text of the First
Amendment explicitly singles out religion for protection. To
require that non-religion be protected along with religion simply
ignores the text of the Constitution itself.
Second, as Michael McConnell points out, while it may be
67. Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager, Meditating Institutions:
Beyond the Public/PrivateDistinction: The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
ConstitutionalBasis for ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245,
1248 (1994).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1271.
70. Id. at 1283.
71. Id. at 1285.
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arguable whether the religion clauses require religious
accommodations, it is clear that the religion clauses at least permit
religious accommodations. 72 McConnell explains that among the
Framers, some "believed that religious concerns should be given
constitutional protection, some thought protection for religious
concerns was desirable but should be left to legislative discretion,
and some opposed exemptions altogether; however, no member of
that it is improper to extend
the First Congress expressed the view
' ' 73
protection to 'religious sentiments.
Third, Eisgruber and Sager's principle of Equal Regard is
incoherent. For instance, "concerns of citizens generally" is not a
standard to which a court can compare the treatment of religions.
"Some secular interests are strong and some are weak. Religious
interests cannot be treated equally with respect to both
concepts." 74 Also, often there will be no secular exemptions with
which a court can compare the religious exemption. In such cases,
the "inquiry may proceed on a hypothetical basis, examining close
analogies to form an educated guess about how the government
would respond if faced with other powerful claims for
exemption." 75 It is exceedingly difficult to discern the legislative
intent for enacted laws, and thus, such a hypothetical inquiry
would provide little, if any, guidance. Thus, Eisgruber and Sager's
account not only runs counter to the text and history of the Free
Exercise Clause, but also ultimately fails to provide courts with
any standard by which to apply the Free Exercise Clause.
B. Because the Same Term "Religion"Is Used in Both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, What
Qualifies as Religion Is the Same for Both Clauses
Another way to solve the puzzle is to deny 3, or deny that the
definition of the term "religion" is the same in both clauses.
Laurence Tribe once proposed defining religion broadly for the
Free Exercise Clause and narrowly for the Establishment
Clause. 76 He recognized that denying 3 would allow an expansive
definition for the Free Exercise Clause to account for new
"legitimate" practices, but avoid an expansive definition for the
Establishment Clause 'lest all 'humane' programs of government
77
be deemed ... suspect."
Perhaps denying 3 would be a viable option if the term
"religion" appeared once in each clause, but both clauses share one
word. They read: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
72. McConnell, supra note 11, at 14.

73. Id.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 827-28.
Id.
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establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof... .,78Thus, Tribe's reading simply ignores the text. Also,
as we have seen, even a single definition for each clause fails to
account for the fact that what qualifies as religion varies with the
legal context. For both reasons, denying 3 is an inadequate
solution to the puzzle.
C. Some Free Exercise Contexts Require a Broad "Conscientious
Objector"Definition
Another way to solve the puzzle is to deny 4, or to deny that a
broad definition, like the "conscientious objector" definition, is ever
needed. The originalist definition that we considered in Part II.A.
entails such a result. 79 Yet as previously discussed, the traditional
originalist definition is too narrow to capture everything that
should qualify for protection under the Free Exercise Clause.8 0 A
narrow definition also would create Establishment Clause
problems. For example, if neither Santeriaism nor Shintoism
qualifies as a religion, then the Establishment Clause would not
forbid government from directly and deliberately subsidizing or

78. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
79. See supra Part II.A.
80. Michael McConnell has argued that the term "religion," as it was used
in the religion clauses, cannot extend to matters of conscience. McConnell's
evidence is that the framers "seriously considered enacting constitutional
protection for 'conscience'. . . and deliberately adopted the term 'religion'
instead." McConnell, supra note 11, at 12. This "historical fact casts doubt on
the suggestion. . . that the constitutional term 'religion' should be broadly
interpreted in order to encompass secular claims of conscience," and thus such
a broad interpretation "would constitute an amendment, not an interpretation,
of the First Amendment, and one that the Framers specifically considered,
debated, and ultimately rejected." Id.
If the issue were whether the term "religion" extends to matters of conscience
in all legal contexts, then the history and text likely would entail that
"religion" cannot extend to matters of conscience. In other words,
if the
religion clauses required a single definition, then McConnell would be correct.
However, a single definition is not helpful, let alone required. Therefore, the
"conscientious objector" definition is not required in all legal contexts.
Thus,
evidence that the Framers rejected the term "conscience" in favor of the term
"religion" does not necessarily preclude the "conscientious objector"
definition
in some contexts.
To see why, consider the following two scenarios where I struggle over which
of two words to choose. First, I understand what both words express and
decide that one captures what I want while the other does not. Second, I
understand what both words express and notice that neither fully captures
what I want. In the second scenario, I choose the word that best captures
what I wish to express, not the word that fully captures what I wish to
express. This means that by choosing one, I do not thereby intend to reject the
other in all contexts. Thus, if the framers struggled over which word best
identified the type of entities about which they were concerned, the framers'
debate simply demonstrates that most of the time the religion clauses do not
extend to mere matters of conscience.
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advocating them. When we deny 4 and opt for a more narrow
definition of the term "religion" in all legal contexts, we solve the
puzzle, but produce unacceptable, counterintuitive legal results.
D. If the Broad "ConscientiousObjector"Definition Applies in All
Establishment Clause Contexts, Then Too Much Government
Conduct Will Be Forbidden
Another way to solve the puzzle is to deny 6, or to deny that a
broad "conscientious objector" definition would cause the
Establishment Clause to forbid too much government conduct.
Andrew Koppelman takes this approach. Koppelman begins with
what he takes to be a constitutional axiom: government may not
declare religious truth.81 From this axiom, Koppelman infers that
Thus, whether
all laws must have a secular purpose.8 2
upon whether
depends
government may accommodate religion
purpose.
secular
a
government can do so while maintaining
For Koppelman, a law has a secular purpose if it fails to show
83
a "preference more specific than support for religion in general,"
'8 4
refers "to the activity of pursuing
where "religion in general
of human existence .. "85
meaning
the
about
questions
ultimate
A law has a secular purpose if the social meaning of the law would
be agreed upon by "nearly any member of society,"8 6 which turns
"on the range of meanings that natives of the culture can
reasonably ascribe to the government action in question"8 7 given
the "context in which the law was enacted."'8
Koppelman characterizes the problem of defining the term
"religion" as one of finding the proper "level of abstraction."8 9
Koppelman defines "religion" at the most general level and
concludes that government "may coherently single out [religion in
Rather than arguing that nongeneral] for special favor." 90
along with religion, Koppelman
be
accommodated
must
religion
argues that religion may be singled out for accommodation, but
only if religion is defined as broadly as possible. In this way,
Koppelman achieves nearly the same practical results as
Eisgruber and Sager while seemingly respecting 1.
Koppelman's account, however, ultimately fails. First, it is
unclear how to determine when "nearly any member of society" 91
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 89 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 114.

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:469

considers a law to have a secular purpose. Koppelman explains
that the requirement depends upon "the range of meanings that
natives of the culture can reasonably ascribe to the government
action in question" 92 given the "context in which the law was
enacted." 93 But what are these? Do tax exemptions for religious
organizations, recognition of the priest-penitent privilege, school
vouchers, the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, or
exemptions
from
anti-discrimination
laws
for religious
organizations have the requisite social meaning?
Koppelman suggests an "authoritative way to resolve disputes
about social meaning": courts should use data similar to that
gathered in trademark disputes. 94 If enough people agree both
that the government is "sponsoring or promoting" religion and that
the sponsorship or promotion "conveys a message that the
government is endorsing the particular religious view," then the
government's action lacks a secular purpose. 95 The problem with
this is that one's opinions about whether two advertisements are
similar enough to cause confusion generally do not depend upon
one's ideology, whereas one's opinions about whether a statute has
a religious social meaning do. There is a bitter division over
whether the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance
''conveys a message" that the government is endorsing
a particular
religious view." 96 How do we determine whether it does?
First, we would need to know the proper question to ask
native speakers. Do we ask whether the phrase "under God" in
the Pledge of Allegiance has a secular purpose, whether the Pledge
of Allegiance as a whole has a secular purpose, or whether, overall,
public schools have a secular purpose? Even assuming that the
proper question is the first, public opinion regarding whether the
phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance has a secular
purpose is unlikely to be the same in, e.g., New York City and Salt
Lake City. It is unlikely that there is a single social meaning that
"enough" Americans ascribe to any given law concerning
religion,
especially contentious ones, which, after all, are those most likely
to be litigated.
Perhaps more importantly, sometimes a narrower set of
entities than what qualifies as religion in general requires
accommodation. If the government must accommodate or protect
"the activity of pursuing ultimate questions about the meaning of
existence," then every philosophy department has the same status
92. Id. at 115.
93. Id. at 147.
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95. Id. at 749-50.
96. See Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 604, 611 (9th Cir.
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as religions. Thus, for example, every private school's philosophy
department must receive the same treatment as the Catholic
Church. In the end, Koppelman's account fails to single out
religion at all, and thereby suffers from the same defects as
Eisgruber and Sager's account.
E.

What Qualifies as Religion Is Not the Same in All Legal
Contexts

The best solution to the puzzle is to deny 5, or to deny that
what qualifies as a religion is the same across all legal contexts.
All other possible solutions to the puzzle presuppose that a single
definition of the term "religion" is required, or at least that a
single definition for each clause is required. Yet as we have seen,
what qualifies as religion varies as the legal context varies. Thus,
the fact that the priest-penitent privilege context requires a
narrow definition does not mean that conscientious objectors
falling outside such a narrow definition do not enjoy protection in
other legal contexts.
There are at least three benefits to understanding that what
qualifies as religion in the religion clauses differs in differing legal
contexts. First, we will cease the quest for a single definition of
the term "religion" to assist courts in interpreting the religion
clauses. We will come to recognize not only that there is no single
definition, but also that even if there were, it would not adequately
serve in all legal contexts.
Second, we will cease attempting to resolve tension between
the clauses that does not exist. For example, recognizing that a
narrow definition is needed in the priest-penitent context will no
longer lead us to conclude that conscientious objections, similar to
those made by Seeger and Welsh, should never qualify as
religious, or that groups falling outside such a narrow definition
never implicate the Establishment Clause. As a result, scholars
should no longer attempt to solve such illusory problems.
Appreciating the contextual nature of what qualifies as religion
may not dissolve all tension between the two clauses, but it will
keep us from developing solutions to problems generated by a false
assumption-that what qualifies as religion is the same in all legal
contexts.
Third, we will recognize that we can legitimately draw upon
interpretations of many other clauses in the Constitution to
interpret the religion clauses.
For instance, where religious
expression is at issue, then the natural place to find relevant
parallels is the Free Speech Clause. 97
Where discrimination

97. Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995),
is an example of the Court treating religious freedom of expression as a kind of
expression protected under the Free Speech Clause.
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against individuals based upon membership in a religion is at
issue, then the natural place to find relevant parallels is the Equal
Protection Clause.98 Pointing out that religion does not always
function like speech, race, or an assembly in some contexts,
however, should not prevent courts from drawing analogies to
these definitions in other contexts. Perhaps the religion clauses
are best viewed as extensions of other clauses into the religious
context. 99
Noticing that what qualifies as religion in the religion clauses
differs in differing legal contexts sheds new light upon religion
clause scholarship. While we still need a way to identify religions
in specific contexts, we can at least eliminate methods that are
fundamentally misguided, and in turn, understand that the socalled "tension between the clauses" is a problem not worthy of the
vast attention that it receives.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no single definition of the term "religion" as it occurs
in ordinary English, at least not one that can help interpret and
apply the religion clauses. The reason for this is simple: what
qualifies as religion differs across differing legal contexts. A single
definition will not work in all legal contexts, and thus, courts and
scholars should stop attempting to provide a definition of the term
"religion" that does.
By recognizing that what qualifies as religion varies as the
legal context varies, we can see that the vast attention given to the
so-called "tension between the clauses" is misplaced. Scholars
should discontinue their search for ways to reduce tension that
presupposes a unique definition of "religion" applies in all legal
contexts. The better approach is to view the religion clauses as an
extension of other clauses-Free Speech Clause, Equal Protection
Clause, etc.-into the religious context. Within these contexts, the
religion clauses forbid certain types of favoritism as well as certain
types of discrimination and exclusion. I have not addressed the
most difficult question: how do we determine when the religion
clauses forbid these things? However, at least we should no longer
be sidetracked by insignificant definitional problems and illusory
puzzles.

98. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), moves the free exercise
doctrine closer to the equal protection doctrine, as articulated in Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
99. For a defense of this reading, see McConnell, supra note 11, at 18.

